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Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-
Tuning Problem 
 
(i) Thought and consciousness 
For something to be conscious is for it to have experience; something is conscious just in case there’s 
something that it’s like to be it.1 According to this standard definition, consciousness is not something 
cognitively sophisticated such that we would be cautious about ascribing it to non-human animals. 
Thoughts, on the other hand, are typically defined as propositional mental representations: believing 
that it’s raining, fearing that climate change is irrevocable, hoping that the conflict will be resolved. In 
contrast to experience, it is much more contentious to what extent, if at all, thought can be ascribed to 
creatures other than humans. Although most philosophers are happy to ascribe conscious experience to 
a rabbit, few would be willing to credit a rabbit with full-fledged propositional representations. 
What do analytic philosophers think is the relationship between thought and consciousness? The 
dominant view in twentieth century analytic philosophy was that thought and consciousness had 
nothing much to do with each other. It was not denied that we typically have experiences when we 
think; when I think about climate change I may have a feeling of panic, or experience images of freak 
weather events. But according to twentieth century orthodoxy, the experiences had when thinking are 
mere accidental accompaniments of thought. I could in principle think about climate change without 
having any emotions or mental imagery at all. And although we tend to have experiences when we 
think, no form of experience is either necessary or sufficient for thought.  
Let us call this view ‘non-phenomenalism about thought’, defined as the conjunction of the following 
two theses: 
1. Thought does not involve a distinctive form of conscious experience, i.e. a form of conscious 
experience involved in, and only in, thought. For the non-phenomenalist, the kinds of 
experience we have when thinking are the kinds of experience we have when perceiving the 
world, or when having emotions; they are not utterly specific to thought. 
                                                          
1 Most people trace this way of defining consciousness back to Nagel (1975), although it appears earlier in Sprigge 
and Montefiore (1971). 
2 
 
2. Thoughts are neither identical with, nor constituted of, states of consciousness. Clear evidence 
of this second thesis is found in the fact that the most influential theories of thought from the 
last century, for example by Jerry Fodor and Donald Davidson, made no mention of 
consciousness.2 
In the twenty first century, there are growing movements opposed to each of these theses. Firstly, there 
are those who defend the reality of ‘cognitive phenomenology’, defined as a distinctive form of 
consciousness found in, and only in, thought.3 Secondly, there are proponents of what Uriah Kriegel 
dubbed the ‘Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program’ (or ‘PIRP’ for short), the philosophical project 
of trying to explain all mental representation, including thought, in terms of consciousness.4 The latter is 
put forward as a bold new approach, with significant advantages over its non-phenomenalist rivals.  
In principle these two views are separable. One could hold that there’s a distinctive kind of 
consciousness involved in and only in thought, but deny that states of cognitive phenomenology are 
identical with or constitutive of thoughts. Conversely one might think that thought is constituted of 
sensory consciousness, and so deny that there is a distinctively cognitive form of experience. But in 
general these two views are held together, leading to a philosophical position according to which 
occurrent thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, states of cognitive phenomenology.5 I will call 
this position ‘cognitive phenomenalism.’ The following analogy might help to explain the view. Almost 
                                                          
2 Dominant twentieth century theories of thought which fit the non-phenomenalist characterisation include 
tracking theories of intentionality defended among others by Millikan 1984, Papineau 1984, Fodor 1990, Dretske 
1990, and the interpretationalism of Davidson 1980 and Dennett 1987. 
3 See Siewert 1998, Horgan & Tienson 2002, Pitt 2004, Strawson 2008, Montague 2016. For a good collection of 
essays from both believers and non-believers in cognitive phenomenology see Bayne & Montague 2011. There is 
some variation in the definition of cognitive phenomenology, with Pitt 2004 on the one hand giving a more 
restrictive definition, and Smithies 2013 on the other giving a more permissive definition. I follow the middle-way 
definition found in the introduction of Bayne & Montague 2011. 
4 See Farkas 2008a/b, Horgan & Graham 2012, Kriegel 2013a, Mendolovici & Bourget 2014. Kriegel 2013b is a good 
collection of essays on phenomenal intentionality. Of course there were some brave defenders of both cognitive 
phenomenology and phenomenal intentionality in the twentieth century, such as Searle 1991, Strawson 1994, Loar 
1995, Siewert 1998. 
5 Some cognitive phenomenalists are eliminitivsts about non-occurrent thought, e.g. Strawson 2008, but most give 
some account of it in terms of occurrent thought, e.g. Searle 1991, Horgan & Tienson 2002, Loar 2003, Kriegal 
2011, Horgan & Graham 2012. Most cognitive phenomenalists accept a mild form of cognitive externalism, broadly 
consistent with the externalist theses defended by Kripke 1972, Putnam 1975 and Burge 1988. Cognitive 
phenomenalism can be reconciled with a certain degree of externalism by distinguishing between narrow content 
and broad content, where the former is taken to be grounded in cognitive phenomenology, and the latter 
grounded in narrow thought content in conjunction with certain causal connections to the environment (see for 
example Horgan & Tienson 2002).However, Farkas 2008a/b defends the purely internalist view that all content is 




everyone agrees that pains are experiences. To be in pain just is to have a certain kind of experience: a 
painful one. According to cognitive phenomenalism, when I have the occurrent thought that, say, 
climate change is irrevocable, I have a certain kind of cognitive experience E, such that my occurrently 
thinking that climate change is irrevocable just is a matter of my having E.  
The view I will be concerned with in this paper combines cognitive phenomenalism with robust realism 
about consciousness, defined as the thesis that facts about consciousness are not grounded in 
functional facts.6 Call this combination ‘robust cognitive phenomenalism.’ In principle one could 
combine cognitive phenomenalism with functionalism, but (as we shall see) such a combination would 
undermine any potential advantages of PIRP over its non-phenomenalist rivals. It is perhaps for this 
reason that most cognitive phenomenalists are robust cognitive phenomenalists.  
We can thus define robust cognitive phenomenalism as the conjunction of the following two theses:  
(A) Occurrent thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, states of cognitive phenomenology 
(which of course, assuming that occurrent thoughts exist, implies that cognitive phenomenology 
exists),  
(C) Robust Realism about Consciousness – Facts about consciousness are not grounded in 
functional facts. 
My aim is to raise a challenge for robust cognitive phenomenalism: the cognitive fine-tuning problem. In 
broad brush strokes the difficulty is that, for the cognitive phenomenalist, there is a distinction between 
three kinds of fact: cognitive phenomenal facts, sensory phenomenal facts, and functional facts. This 
distinction gives rise to the challenge of explaining why, in actuality, these three phenomena tend to be 
matched together in ways that respect norms of rationality.  
(ii) The Modal Independence Argument 
The problem I want to raise draws inspiration from a recent paper by Adam Pautz, in which he considers 
a variety of non-actual scenarios in which cognitive phenomenal facts, sensory phenomenal facts, and 
functional facts come apart from each other in peculiar ways.7 The most striking cases are what he calls 
                                                          
6 To be more specific, the robust realist denies that facts about consciousness are grounded in pure functional 
facts, i.e. facts which can be entirely grasped in causal terms (together perhaps with terms referring to sensory 
inputs and behavioural outputs). As I discuss later in the paper, it is consistent with robust realism to identify or 
ground facts about consciousness in facts about powerful qualities.   
7 Pautz 2013. 
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‘separation cases’, in which both sensory and cognitive phenomenology are present, but are paired 
together in what are intuitively ill-fitting combinations.  
In one such case, Pautz focuses on the putative state of cognitive phenomenology, represented by the 
letter P, underlying the thought ‘there is a picture on the wall behind me.’ In actuality, P is associated 
with certain forms of sensory consciousness – e.g. an image of a picture, or the sentence ‘there is a 
picture behind me’ running through the mind – as well as with certain behavioural dispositions – e.g. 
being disposed to report that there is a picture behind one if asked. But in Pautz’s imaginary scenario, a 
character called Charlie has P with intuitively ‘ill-fitting’ sensory phenomenology – a visual experience of 
a clock, the sentence ‘there is a clock on the wall’ running though his mind – and ‘ill-fitting’ behavioural 
dispositions – Charlie is disposed to report that there is clock on the wall on the wall if asked. Another 
separation case involves mathematical babies: creatures with the same behavioural dispositions and 
sensory consciousness as babies, but with cognitive phenomenology constitutive of complex 
mathematical thought.  
Pautz also discusses what we can call ‘isolation cases’: cases in which there is sensory consciousness in 
the absence of cognitive consciousness or vice versa. Pautz calls cases of sensory consciousness in the 
absence of cognitive consciousness, ‘absent cognitive qualia’ cases, and cases of cognitive consciousness 
without sensory consciousness, ‘disembodied qualia’ cases. In order to test the imaginability of absent 
cognitive qualia cases, Pautz asks you (the reader) to recall an experience in which someone said to you, 
‘Let’s go to the bar later’ and you quickly formed the visual image of the bar in question and followed up 
with a question about the time. Pautz then asks you to imagine an experience identical in terms of 
sensory consciousness and associated functional states, but profoundly different because there is no 
cognitive phenomenology. In order to test to imaginability of cases of disembodied cognitive qualia, 
Pautz asks the reader to try to imagine ‘a rich phenomenal life that overlaps with our actual phenomenal 
life, only it is totally non-sensory.’8 
Let us use the general terms ‘mix and match’ cases for all of these non-actual scenarios in which thought 
or cognitive phenomenal states on the one hand, and sensory phenomenal states/functional states on 
the other, come apart in strange ways, either by existing in strange combinations or by one existing 
without the other. Pautz wants to use his mix and match cases to argue against cognitive 
phenomenalism. He hopes the reader will agree that the cases he considers are: 
                                                          
8 Pautz 2013: 219. 
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(A) impossible to imagine, and  
(B) (assuming that cognitive phenomenology grounds thoughts) incoherent,  
In support of the latter point, he suggests that there are ‘sensory-functional constraints’ on belief and 
desire. His positive account of these sensory-functional constraints is spelt out in his positive theory, 
which we will touch on later in this paper. But the intuitive starting point is that we can rule out a priori 
certain combinations of thought with sensory phenomenal states/functional states. For example, a baby 
just does not have the right sensory states/functional states to count as a creature with mathematical 
thought, and we can know this a priori.  
The non-imaginability of the mix and match cases, according to Pautz, counts against the reality of 
cognitive phenomenology. For if states of cognitive phenomenology existed then (by definition) they 
would be distinct from states of sensory phenomenology and functional states, and so it ought to be 
possible to recombine these three kinds of state in imagination, or to imagine one without the other. 
For example, we ought to be able to imagine sensory consciousness without cognitive consciousness 
and vice versa, just as we can imagine visual consciousness without auditory consciousness and vice 
versa. Moreover, if cognitive phenomenal states, and thereby thought, are distinct from sensory 
phenomenal states and functional states, this would seem to imply the genuine possibility of these three 
elements being freely combined. That is to say, cognitive phenomenalism seems to imply the genuine 
possibility of the mix and match cases. If Pautz is right that the mix and match cases are incoherent, this 
would seem to give us a reason to reject the commitments of cognitive phenomenalism.  
We can sum this up as the following against cognitive phenomenalism: 
The Modal Independent Argument 
Premise 1 – If cognitive phenomenalism is true, the mix and match cases (which Pautz considers) 
would be both coherent and readily imaginable. 
Premise 2 – The mix and match cases are neither coherent nor readily imaginable. 
Conclusion – Therefore, cognitive phenomenalism is false. 
(iii) Reponses to the modal independence argument 
There seem to me quite plausible responses the cognitive phenomenalist might make to Pautz’s 
argument. First consider the argument from the non-imaginability of separation cases. The cognitive 
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phenomenalist might respond that some combinations of our conscious states are just hard to imagine, 
e.g. it is difficult to imagine finding pleasure in the sight of vomit. It does not follow from the fact that 
it’s hard (perhaps even psychologically impossible) to imagine finding pleasure in the visual experience 
of vomit, that pleasure and the visual experience of vomit are not two distinct forms of conscious 
experience. By analogy, the cognitive phenomenalist might argue that it does not follow from its being 
hard (or even psychologically impossible) to imagine certain highly unusual combinations of sensory 
experience and cognitive experience, that we are not in reality dealing with two distinct kinds of 
consciousness. 
A similar response might be made to the argument from the alleged non-imaginability of isolation cases. 
The cognitive phenomenalist might appeal to certain cases in which one has a unified experience 
involving two distinct sub-experiences, but it’s just incredibly hard (maybe even psychologically 
impossible) to imagine the sub-experiences in isolation from each other. There are grounds for thinking 
that pain has two elements: a non-affective and an affective component, the latter being the ‘hurtiness’ 
of pain. The reason for thinking this arises from cases of pain asymbolia, a rare neurological condition 
caused by lesions to the posterior insula that produces complete and thoroughgoing indifference to 
pain.9 Patients with pain asymbolia claim that the pain is still there, but that it just doesn’t bother them 
anymore. A plausible explanation of this fact is that the feeling most people call ‘pain’ involves a non-
affective aspect and a ‘hurty’ affective aspect, and that patients with asymbolia have the former without 
the latter. Nonetheless, and even if one accepts this view, it remains extremely hard (perhaps 
impossible) through introspection to imagination one of these aspects of pain without the other. The 
cognitive phenomenalist might claim that something analogous is true of unified human experiences 
involving both sensory and cognitive consciousness: although formed of two distinct kinds of 
consciousness it’s just very hard to imagine these distinct kinds of consciousness in isolation.10 
Turning to the argument from alleged incoherence, clearly the mix and match cases are absurd in some 
sense. But the cognitive phenomenalist could suggest that they are absurd not in the sense of being a 
priori incoherent, but in the sense of being radically sceptical scenarios. Consider the hypothesis that 
nobody other than oneself is conscious. It is plausible that this hypothesis is perfectly coherent, but one 
we are entitled to assume is false. The cognitive phenomenalist might say something analogous 
                                                          
9 Grahek 2007, Klein 2015. 
10 In the case of pain, it seems that we cannot even distinguish the two aspects. However, the cognitive 
phenomenalist might argue, perhaps with the help of contrast arguments (Chudnoff 2015), that we can distinguish 
the cognitive from the sensory aspects of experience, even if we can’t imagine having one without the other.  
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concerning the scenarios of babies thinking complex mathematics: it is a coherent but nonetheless 
radically farfetched scenario. It is at least not obvious whether this or Pautz’s account of the absurdity of 
the mix and match cases is to be preferred. 
For what it’s worth, many cognitive phenomenalists just don’t share Pautz’s intuitive reactions to his 
thought experiments, at least not to the separation cases. Horgan accepts the coherence and 
imaginability of sensory consciousness without cognitive consciousness, whilst Kriegel accepts the 
coherence and imaginability of disembodied thought.11 Furthermore, they do not do so reluctantly, but 
as an intuitive starting point to argue for the existence of cognitive phenomenology or for phenomenal 
intentionality. Of course it is to be expected that one’s opponent disagrees with one. But the aim of an 
argument is to present one’s opponent with a bullet they feel at least a little uncomfortable with biting; 
whereas what Pautz sees as bullets to be bitten, his opponents see as candy to be relished.12  
(iv) The modal formulation of the cognitive fine-tuning problem 
I want to suggest a different use of the mix and match cases. Arguments against cognitive 
phenomenalism which start from the intuition that mix and match cases are incoherent and/or 
unimaginable seem to me to have little dialectical force, for the reasons I gave in the last section. I 
propose an alternative way of using the mix and match cases to challenge cognitive phenomenalism: 
instead of trying to deny the (epistemic or metaphysical) possibility of the mix and match cases, we can 
present them as constituting an explanatory obligation for the cognitive phenomenalist. The challenge 
goes as follows: given that (according to your view) mix and match cases are possible, why (according to 
your view) aren’t they actual? 
I will try to illustrate this challenge with some of my own mix and match cases. Meet Inverted Ian. 
Inverted Ian has states of cognitive phenomenology which constitute a strong desire to have his body 
damaged and a strong desire not to have sex and eat burgers. However, Ian lives in a strange possible 
world, where the laws of nature endow his conscious states with peculiar causal powers. The state of 
cognitive phenomenology underlying his desire for bodily damage causes Ian to avoid having his body 
damaged, and the state of cognitive phenomenology underlying his aversion to sex and burgers causes 
                                                          
11 Horgan 2011. Kriegel MS. 
12 Montague forthcoming also has a response to Pautz’s modal independent argument. Montague’s response 
would not help with the non-modal formulation of the cognitive fine-tuning problem (discussed below), as it does 
not provide us with an explanation of the fact that cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states and 
functional states are matched together in ways that respect rational norms. 
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him to seek out sex and burgers. The result is that Ian ends up behaving just like an ordinary human 
being with a healthy appetite for sex and burgers. 
Inverted Ian is a deeply irrational creature. He displays practical irrationality: Ian pursues what he 
desires to avoid, and avoids what he desires to pursue. He also arguably displays conative irrationality: 
Ian desires what he has strong reason to avoid (pain and harm to himself), and desires to avoid what he 
has reason to pursue (pleasure). 
Meet another of my imaginary friends: Dotty Dawkins. Dotty Dawkins is a functional duplicate of Richard 
Dawkins, and shares all of Dawkins’ sensory conscious states. However, Dotty Dawkins differs from 
actual Dawkins in his cognitive phenomenology: whenever actual Dawkins has cognitive phenomenology 
that constitutes the belief that P, Dotty Dawkins has cognitive phenomenology that constitutes the 
belief that not P. Dotty Dawkins actually believes that God exists, but this belief never shows up in his 
behaviour. Dotty Dawkins believes that he has no hands, even though his daily sensory experiences 
testifies to the contrary. 
Whilst Inverted Ian is marked by a kind of practical irrationality, Dotty Dawkins displays deep cognitive 
irrationality. His beliefs are not rationally guided by the evidence of his sensory experience, and are not 
expressed in his behaviour in a rationally appropriate way.  
Through the contrast to my mix and match cases, we can appreciate the extent to which human beings 
are deeply rational creatures. Of course people display all sorts of irrationality, but this is upon a 
significant foundation of rationality. We can divide this rationality into (at least) three categories:   
 Practical rationality – People tend to satisfy their desires, in the light of their beliefs. Most 
historical explanations are reliant on this. Consider, for example, the following explanation for 
why a certain political party won an election: most people wanted the economy to improve and 
they believed that party X would improve the economy. This kind of explanation is dependent 
on the assumption that people tend to do what they want in the light of what they believe. 
 Theoretical rationality – People’s beliefs are rationally guided by their sensory experiences. We 
are all familiar with cases of people believing against the evidence. But almost everybody 
believes what is rationally appropriate in the light of their immediate sensory experiences, e.g. 
when someone has an experience of a table in front of them, they tend to believe that there is a 
table in front of them (unless they believe that they are hallucinating, or know that they have 
taken LSD, etc.) 
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 Conative rationality – To a large extent, people desire things they have some reason to desire, 
e.g. pleasure and knowledge, and desire to avoid are things they have some reason to avoid, e.g. 
pain and self-harm. This is not to say that humans do not exhibit self-destructive desires and 
neurotic compulsions. And arguably many of the quite standard things humans aim for are 
basically irrational goals, e.g. fame or the desire to accumulate money for its own sake. 
Nonetheless, we seldom if ever find human beings who do not possess many conatively rational 
desires, and we don’t tend to find humans with lives structured around some essentially 
pointless aim, e.g. counting blades of grass for its own sake. 
Obviously much more could be said about the finer nuances of human rationality. My point here is 
simply to draw attention to the entirely uncontentious fact that humans exhibit significant rationality, 
albeit mixed with strong elements of irrationality.   
Although uncontentious, this fact is, I want to suggest, hard for the cognitive phenomenalist to account 
for; this is the essence of the cognitive fine-tuning problem. I will begin with a modal formulation of the 
challenge. As we will see below, the essence of the challenge does not depend on this modal 
formulation, but it provides a vivid way of setting up the problem.  
According to cognitive phenomenalism, thoughts (constituted of states of cognitive phenomenology), 
states of sensory consciousness and functional states, are all distinct properties of a human being. This 
seems to imply: 
Modal Implication – Cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states and functional 
states could be ‘mixed and matched’ in all sorts of ways that do not respect, and even 
systematically violate, rational norms, e.g. Inverted Ian and Dotty Dawkins are possible. 
And because cognitive phenomenalism has this modal implication, it seems to follow that: 
The Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem (modal formulation) – The cognitive phenomenalist is 
obliged to give an explanation of why, of all the ways cognitive phenomenal states and 




As the name suggests, the problem (at least in this modal formulation) can be understood by analogy to 
the philosophical problems raised by the so-called ‘fine-tuning’ of the laws of nature.13 The basic laws of 
physics (and the initial conditions of the universe) seem to be ‘fine-tuned’ for life in the sense that (i) the 
basic laws (and the initial conditions of the universe) are compatible with the eventual emergence of 
life, (ii) the intrinsic probability of laws (and initial conditions) compatible with the existence of life is 
extremely low, as life can occur only in possible worlds in which certain constants (in the fundamental 
laws and initial conditions) lie in an extremely narrow range. Many hold that (i) and (ii) lead to an 
explanatory obligation to explain why, of all the ways the laws of nature might have been, they turned 
out to be such as to be compatible with the emergence of life. Analogously, the Modal Implication of 
cognitive phenomenalism seems to lead to an explanatory obligation to explain why, of all the ways 
cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states, and functional states might have been 
matched up, they tend to be matched up in ways that respect rational norms.    
The analogy should not be interpreted too strictly. Many have argued that the alleged problem arising 
from the ‘fine-tuning’ of the laws of nature is in reality a pseudo-problem, emerging from a certain kind 
of selection bias. This is compatible with the cognitive fine-tuning problem being a genuine problem, or 
at least a genuine problem assuming cognitive phenomenalism. The analogy is only intended as a 
heuristic device.  
There is, however, one important commonality between the two fine tuning arguments, and that is in 
both cases it is hard to see how biological natural selection could help with the problem. In the case of 
the traditional fine-tuning argument, biological natural selection cannot help as we are seeking an 
explanation of facts about the universe which preceded the emergence of biology: fundamental laws of 
nature and initial conditions of the universe.14 The problem with using biological natural selection to 
help with the cognitive fine-tuning problem is slightly different. In this case, the difficulty is that any 
evolutionary account of the emergence of thought already assumes a solution to the cognitive fine-
tuning problem. Consider an explanation of the fact that humans have a desire for food and sex, in 
terms of the fact that eating and copulating is beneficial to the survival of the organism and/or its 
species. Any such explanation implicitly assumes that humans will tend to respond in a rationally 
                                                          
13 There is a great deal of literature on this topic. Swinburne (1979/2004, ch. 8) appeals to the fine-tuning of the 
universe to argue for the existence of God. 
14 Smolin (1997) has defended a solution to the fine-tuning problem involving a principle of natural selection 




appropriate way to the desire for food and sex, i.e. by trying to get those things. It is only given this 
assumption that the desires for food and sex are conducive to survival. But this is the very thing that the 
cognitive fine-tuning problem demands an explanation of. Similarly, an evolutionary explanation of why 
we have sensory experience in terms of its survival advantage implicitly assumes that our beliefs will be 
significantly rationally guided by our sensory experience. And this assumption is the very thing that the 
cognitive fine-tuning problem demands an explanation of.  
To be clear: I’m not saying that there is anything wrong with standard evolutionary explanations of 
thought, e.g. of the fact that humans desire food and sex. It is arguably not the job of such evolutionary 
explanations to solve the philosophical problem of cognitive fine-tuning. Compare: evolutionary 
explanations also involve reference to individuals and their properties, but evolutionary biologists are 
not obliged to solve the philosophical problems raised by Bradley’s regress that threaten the coherence 
of such notions.15 And in any case, for many theories of thought the cognitive fine-tuning problem will 
simply not arise (in a moment we will explore a non-phenomenalist view for which this problem does 
not arise). The point is just that given that evolutionary explanations already assume that the functional 
states of an organism are (more or less) rationally appropriate relative to its thought content, and that 
its thought content is (more or less) rationally appropriate relative to its sensory consciousness. And for 
this reason evolutionary explanations cannot help with explaining this fact; or at least more would need 
to be said to show how they could.16 
(v) Necessary connections and a non-modal formulation of the 
problem 
Faced with the problem outlined above, the cognitive phenomenalist might try to argue that, although 
cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states, and functioning states are all distinct from 
each other, they are nonetheless necessary connected to each other in certain specific ways, such that 
mix and match cases are impossible. Call this the ‘Necessary Connections Solution’ to the modal 
formulation of the cognitive fine-tuning problem. More would need to be said. Cognitive 
                                                          
15 The worry is rooted in Bradley’s famous regress argument against the possibility of external relations (Bradley 
1935: 643; van Inwagen 1993: 35–6). 
16 The cognitive fine-tuning problem would arise for anyone who thinks that cognitive states are distinct from 
sensory states and from functional states, and so in a sense it is not dependent on a commitment to cognitive 
states being phenomenal. However, one is most likely to be driven to this view because one is a cognitive 
phenomenalist and a robust realist about consciousness (and as I explain in section VI cognitive phenomenalists 
have good reason to be robust realists about consciousness). 
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phenomenalism seems to imply that these three kinds of state are distinct, which gives us prima facie 
reason to take them to be modally independent. However, there are various ways in which the 
Necessary Connections Solution might be developed.  
One option is to adopt the ‘powerful qualities’ thesis, associated with John Heil and C. B. Martin, 
according to which categorical states are identical with causal powers.17 The robust realist component of 
robust cognitive phenomenalism is defined in opposition to functionalism about consciousness. 
However, as I emphasized in footnote 6 when defining robust cognitive phenomenalism, the 
‘functionalism’ in question is best understood as the thesis that facts about consciousness are grounded 
in pure functional facts, i.e. facts which can be wholly grasped in causal terms (together perhaps with 
terms referring to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs). This kind of functionalism is to be 
distinguished from the powerful qualities view; according to the latter view properties have an 
irreducibly categorical nature, it’s just that each categorical nature is identical with a certain kind of 
causal power.  
By adopting this view, the robust cognitive phenomenal might hold that, although each state of 
cognitive phenomenology has a fully categorical nature (in line with robust realism), that fully 
categorical nature essentially grounds a functional state. This would rule out the possibility of cognitive 
phenomenal states and functional ‘floating free’ from each other. Ex hypothesi Inverted Ian has the 
cognitive states that an actual human could have – the cognitive phenomenology which constitutes 
desiring bodily damage and desiring to avoid sex and burger consumption – but in him those states have 
very different causal powers than they would in an actual human being – in Ian they lead to avoidance 
of bodily damage and the seeking out of sex and burgers. If states of cognitive phenomenology are 
identical with their causal powers, then this is impossible.   
Another possibility is that the cognitive phenomenalist might make sense of the necessary connections 
solution by adopting a form of holism. Elijah Chudnoff has explored this option, specifically as a 
response to Pautz’s argument.18 Chudnoff defines ‘phenomenal holism’ as the view that partial 
phenomenal states depend on the total phenomenal state to which they belong; so, for example, the 
anxiety I am currently feeling depends for its specific character on the entire conscious experience with 
which it co-exists: my current visual, auditory, tactile, experiences, my whole emotional state, etc.  
                                                          
17 Martin 2007 and in Armstrong et al 1996, Martin & Heil 1998, Heil 2003, 2012, Strawson 2008. 
18 Chudnoff 2015, chapter 5. 
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If phenomenal holism is true, and if actual states of sensory phenomenology always go along with states 
of cognitive phenomenology and vice versa, it follows that isolation cases are impossible, at least 
isolation cases involving actual states of cognitive and sensory phenomenology. To see this, consider 
one of my sensory states S. According to phenomenal holism, S is dependent on my entire current 
conscious experience E, which we are assuming contains at least one state of cognitive phenomenology 
C. Given that S is dependent on E, S cannot exist without E; and whenever E exists, C exists as part of it. 
Hence, there is no possible conscious experience involving S but not C. The possibility of (actual) sensory 
consciousness without cognitive consciousness is ruled out (the same form of argument could be used 
to rule out cognitive consciousness without sensory consciousness). Indeed, given phenomenal holism, 
for any state of cognitive phenomenology C and any state of sensory consciousness S, if C is actually co-
experienced with S, then C cannot exist without S (and vice versa).   
These claims would need to be articulated and defended in more detail, but there is the potential here 
for a plausible response to the modal formulation of the cognitive fine-tuning problem. And if the 
Necessary Connections Solution is plausible, then this spells further trouble for Pautz’s Modal 
Independence Argument, as it provides a way for the cognitive phenomenalist to agree with Pautz that 
his mix and match cases are impossible whilst maintaining cognitive phenomenalism. However, even if 
these do allow the cognitive phenomenalist to respond to the modal formulation of the cognitive fine-
tuning problem, the essential problem is not removed. For even if there are necessary connections 
between cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states and functional states, we still require 
an explanation as to why those necessary connections respect rational norms.  
Let me develop this claim through in relation to each of the above strategies for making sense of the 
Necessary Connections Solution. Firstly, consider the powerful qualities view. Proponents of this view 
advocate an identity between categorical properties and causal powers, but they still allow a conceptual 
distinction between these two ways of thinking about properties. In other words, for any given property, 
we can think of it qua categorical property or qua causal power. It is this that makes the distinction 
between the powerful qualities view and a ‘pure powers view’; according to the latter there is nothing 
more to the nature of the property that what can be grasped in causal terms.  
Now suppose there is an identity between the state of cognitive phenomenology which constitutes a 
desire to eat burgers and a causal power which leads an individual to try to eat burgers. To conceive of 
the state qua state of cognitive phenomenology would be to conceive of it in terms of what it’s like to 
have it, which is also to conceive of it in terms of its phenomenally constituted thought content, i.e. as a 
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desire to avoid eating burgers. To conceive of that state qua causal power would be to conceive of it in 
terms of what it does, i.e. (very roughly) to conceive of it as a state that causes the individual to seek 
burgers. For an analytic functionalist, descriptions of these states will be analytically equivalent: for an 
individual to desire burgers just is for her to instantiate some complex functional state. But for a robust 
realist adopting the powerful qualities view, the two descriptions are a priori distinct: the former 
description picks out an intrinsic state of thought-constituting phenomenal character, whilst the latter 
description picks out that same state in terms of what it essentially does. 
There is still something that needs explaining here. There is a normatively appropriate match between 
the phenomenally-constituted content of the state (which we apprehend when conceiving of it in terms 
of what it’s like), and the behavioural effects of the state (which we apprehend when conceiving of it 
qua dispositional state). It is rationally appropriate for a cognitive state with the content of being a 
desire for burgers to be matched with a dispositional state of seeking out burgers; it is incumbent on the 
powerful qualityist robust cognitive phenomenalist to explain the fact that there is a rationally 
appropriate match between these two ways of describing the state. For the reductive functionalist, 
there is no question: to desire burgers just is (roughly) to be in a functional state of seeking out burgers. 
But for the powerful qualityist cognitive phenomenalist to desire burgers is to have an intrinsic state of 
with a certain phenomenal character. That intrinsic state of cognitive phenomenology has certain causal 
powers essentially, but the question still remains: why is it that those essential causal powers fit with 
the content constituted by the intrinsic phenomenal character, in a way that respects norms of practical 
rationality?   
As Thomas Nagel points out: 
Explanation, unlike causation, is not just of an event, but of an event under a description. An 
explanation must show why it was likely that an event of that type occurred. We may know the 
causes of several members of a family in near succession, but that will not explain why several 
members of that family died, as such, unless there is some relation among the causes of the 
individual deaths that makes it antecedently likely that they would strike the group – such as a 
vendetta or a genetic disease.19 
The powerful qualityist robust cognitive phenomenalist owes us an explanation of why an event falling 
under a certain phenomenal description is appropriately matched to an event falling under a certain 
                                                          
19 Nagel 2012: 47. 
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causal description. Of course, if the view is true, then these two descriptions are necessarily co-
extensive. And if we knew for certain that powerful qualityist cognitive phenomenalism was true, then 
we may just have to accept the rationally appropriate match as an unexplained fluke. But I take it that 
(like any other philosophical view) we don’t know for certain that powerful qualityist cognitive 
phenomenalism is true; and if the view ends up entailing that the rationally appropriate match between 
these two descriptions of cognitively conscious states is an unexplained fluke, then this fact strongly 
counts against its truth.  
Turn now to the phenomenal holist form of the Necessary Connections Solution. This gives us an 
account of why actual states of sensory phenomenology cannot float free of actual states of cognitive 
phenomenology: if the state of cognitive phenomenology C that realizes my belief that there is a table in 
front of me depends on my whole current experience E, and E essentially involves a sensory experience 
of a table S, it follows that C and S cannot exist without each other. But this does not in itself explain 
why my states of cognitive phenomenology and my sensory phenomenology are necessarily connected 
in such a way as to respect rational norms, as is exhibited for example by the rationally appropriate 
match of C with S.  
Here’s another way of putting the point against both of these forms of the Necessary Connections 
Solution. My demand in this paper is for an explanation of why allegedly distinct states – cognitive 
phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states and functional states – are matched together in 
rationally appropriate ways. To say ‘They just are’ isn’t a good answer; but to say ‘They just are 
necessarily’ isn’t a good answer either. 
This demand for explanation is not unreasonable, as can be seen from the fact that it is a demand that 
standard non-phenomenalist (or semi-phenomenalist) accounts of thought can answer. After raising 
challenges to cognitive phenomenalism, Pautz goes on to contrast the view with the form of a priori 
functionalism defended by David Lewis.20 Lewis combines functionalism with interpretationalism, to 
form the view that: for an individual I to have a thought with content P is for it to be part of the best 
interpretation of I that she has P, where ‘best interpretations’ are constrained by norms of rationality. 
The norms of rationality include a behaviour rationalization principle, according to which all things being 
equal an individual tends to have beliefs and desires that makes her behaviour largely rational. To take 
an example pertinent to our current concerns: if it is part of the best interpretation of John’s behaviour 
                                                          
20 Pautz 2013: section 4. He builds on Lewis 1974.  
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that he desires burgers – because, for example, he eats a lot of burgers – then it is thereby the case that 
John desires burgers. By bringing rational norms into the analysis of thought, Lewis’s a priori 
functionalism explains why thought and rational behaviour are matched together in such a way as to 
respect rational norms: all it is for John to desire burgers is for it to be part of the (rational-principle-
respecting) best interpretation of his behaviour that he desires burgers.   
In the final part of his paper, Pautz outlines a form of a priori functionalism which embraces elements of 
the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program; a view he calls ‘phenomenal functionalism.’ On this 
view both facts about sensory consciousness and facts about behavioural functioning are included in the 
facts relevant to the best interpretation. Lewis’s functionalism includes a principle of charity in the 
norms of interpretation, such that all things being equal an individual’s beliefs are objectively reasonable 
givens one’s history of sensory experiences and evidence. Pautz argues that there is a lack of clarity in 
Lewis’s view as to what ‘evidence’ amounts to, and he tries to plug this gap by understanding evidence 
as sensory consciousness, which he takes to be richly intentional. On the resulting view, for Sarah to 
have the belief that there is a table in front of her is for it to be the case that the (rational-principle-
respecting) best interpretation of her sensory states and behavioural states ascribes to her the belief 
that there is a table in front of her. This has the potential to explain the appropriate match between 
Sarah’s sensory state of seeing a table in front of her and her belief that there is a table in front of her: 
the norms of rationality involved in the analysis of thought favour such appropriate matches. 
The problem for the robust cognitive phenomenalism is that, given that thought is constituted by 
phenomenology, it’s hard to see how rational norms could be involved in the analysis of thought. And if 
rational norms do not come into the analysis of thought – into what it is to have thought – then it’s 
somewhat mysterious why thoughts tend to respect rational norms in their relationships with sensory 
states and functional states.21 This creates a demand for explanation, a demand which remains even if 
these relationships are necessary rather than contingent. Thus, the modal assumption involved in the 
modal formulation of the cognitive fine-tuning problem can be dropped, leading to a non-modal 
formulation of the problem:  
The Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem (non-modal formulation) – The cognitive phenomenalist is 
obliged to give an explanation of why cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states, 
and functional states tend to be matched in rationally appropriate ways. 
                                                          
21 See Rosen 2010 for more detail on the notion of metaphysics analysis I am working with here. 
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(vi) Non-robust solutions 
How could the cognitive phenomenalist solve, or circumnavigate the cognitive fine-tuning problem? One 
option is to deny or dilute some of the commitments of robust cognitive phenomenalism. To remind 
ourselves, the commitments are as follows: 
(A) Thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, states of cognitive phenomenology, 
(B) Robust Realism about Consciousness – Facts about consciousness are not grounded in 
functionalism facts. 
There are two ways of denying (A). One option is to deny the existence of cognitive phenomenology, 
whilst nonetheless holding that thought is grounded in consciousness. This may remove part of the 
problem: if there is no such thing as cognitive phenomenology, then perhaps there is no longer an 
obligation to explain the supposed rationally appropriate matchings of cognitive phenomenology with 
sensory phenomenology.22 However, if the states of consciousness underlying thought are distinct from 
functional states, we may still be left with a difficulty explaining rationally appropriate matchings 
between cognitive states and functional states. A more radical way of denying (A) is to hold that the 
grounding of thought has nothing to do with consciousness. Depending on the details of the alternative 
view of the grounding of thought, this has the potential to remove to problem altogether. We saw 
above how certain forms of a priori functionalism can explain cognitive fine-tuning by bringing 
constitutive principles of rationality into the analysis of what it is to have thought. However, this more 
radical denial of (A) gives up on the whole project of trying to explaining thought in terms of 
consciousness. If the cognitive fine-tuning problem rules out this project, then that is a significant 
conclusion. 
In between the view that thought is entirely grounded in consciousness, and the view that the 
grounding of thought has nothing to do with consciousness, is Pautz’s view – phenomenal functionalism 
– according to which thought is grounded in facts about sensory consciousness in conjunction with 
functional facts. I have in this paper no objections to this view, but it is itself a significant rowing back 
                                                          
22 Whether even this problem goes away will depend on the details of the view. There could still be a need to 
explain the rationally appropriate matchings between those states of sensory phenomenology which ground 
cognition and those which don’t.  
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from the project of explain all mental representation in terms of consciousness.23 Again, it is dialectically 
significant if the cognitive fine-tuning problem forces us to this position. 
The cognitive phenomenalist might try to avoid the cognitive fine-tuning problem by accepting (A) but 
denying (B). Thus, she might hold that thought is grounded in cognitive consciousness, but that at a 
more fundamental level facts about cognitive consciousness are grounded in functional facts. Once we 
bring in this more fundamental grounding relationship, the rational connections between cognitive 
phenomenal states and functional states might be explained in terms of functional analyses of states of 
cognitive phenomenology, leading to a solution to (or avoidance of) the cognitive fine-tuning problem 
resembling that of the a priori functionalist discussed above. 
This strategy preserves the letter of cognitive phenomenalism – thought is accounted for in terms of a 
distinctive kind of cognitive consciousness – but the reduction of consciousness undermines its spirit. 
Recall that the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP), of which cognitive phenomenalism 
is one aspect, is put forward as a bold new approach with avoids many of the difficulties facing non-
phenomenalist rivals. Many proponents of PIRP have pressed challenges to causal accounts of 
representation, e.g. the disjunction problem and the problem of accounting for determinate content, 
and then used this as the basis for a defence of PIRP.24 As they see it, PIRP is to be preferred on the 
grounds that it avoids these difficulties which plague causal theories of representation. But if we explain 
representation in terms of consciousness, but then explain consciousness in terms of functional facts, 
then the problems proponents of PIRP point to for causal accounts are going to re-emerge at this more 
fundamental level, and the digression via consciousness will have achieved nothing. This is why a 
commitment to robust realism about consciousness goes naturally with cognitive phenomenalism; 
without it PIRP loses many of its alleged advantages over rival theories of mental representation. 
None of this is decisive, but it gives the cognitive phenomenalist reason to want to hold onto the 
commitments of robust cognitive phenomenalism. At the very least we can say that it is dialectically 
significant if the cognitive fine-tuning problem forces the robust cognitive phenomenalist to drop some 
                                                          
23 Even when we take into account the two standard qualifications to PIRP discussed in footnote 5, Pautz’s view is 
still a significant rowing back from the aims of PIRP as they are standardly understood. 
24 Mendelovici & Bourget 2014 argue for PIRP on the basis that it avoids the disjunction problem that plagues 
tracking theories. Horgan & Tienson 2002, Strawson 2008, Horgan & Graham 2012 all argue that functional facts 
can’t secure determinate content; and that a commitment to phenomenal intentionality is needed for this. 
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of these commitments. Thus, we have reason to examine the prospects for a solution to the cognitive 
fine-tuning problem consistent with the commitments of robust cognitive phenomenalism. 
(vii) Robust Solutions 
How might the cognitive fine-tuning problem be solved without giving up any of the commitments of 
robust cognitive phenomenalism? The only options I can think of are ones that are wildly at odds with 
naturalism about the mind.25 Here are a few possibilities. 
Option 1: Divine intervention or pre-established harmony 
One proposed solution to the standard fine-tuning problem is intelligent design. If the universe was 
brought into existence by an intelligent being who wanted to bring about life, then we arguably have an 
explanation of why the laws and initial conditions of the universe are exactly as they need to be for 
there to be life: the intelligent creator made them that way in order to allow for the possibility of life. 
Analogously, the robust cognitive phenomenalist might explain the cognitive fine-tuning in terms of the 
action of God to ensure an appropriate match between cognitive phenomenology and 
sensory/functional facts.  
This might be done either by constant intervention: e.g. God sees that Dawkins’ functional states are 
suited to atheism, and so ensures that Dawkins has cognitive phenomenology to ground belief that God 
doesn’t exist, e.g. God sees that Ian has a cognitive phenomenological desire to avoid burgers, and so 
ensures that the causal powers of that state lead him to avoid burgers. Alternately, it might be proposed 
that God has set up parallel deterministic systems of mental and physical in such a way that, despite 
there being no interaction between the two, they will inevitably run in harmony, i.e. cognitive 
phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states and functional states will always be matched in a way 
that reflects rational norms. In either case we explain the appropriate matches in terms of God’s desire 
to create rational creatures. 
                                                          
25 What is naturalism? I am attracted to Gideon Rosen’s (201: 111) definition, ‘The naturalist’s fundamental 
thought is that certain peculiar aspects of our world—the human world—are not among the fundamental features 
of reality. Human beings think; most of nature doesn’t. Human beings are governed by norms; most of nature isn’t. 
These (more or less) distinctively human aspects of reality may be genuine; but according to the naturalist, they 
are not fundamental.’ Even without a specific definition, it seems clear that the robust solutions considered here 
are inconsistent with most understandings of what metaphysical naturalism amounts to. 
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This explanation of course bears the ontological cost of a commitment to God. And in the case of 
constant divine intervention, there is also arguably an inelegance in the postulation of a ‘micro-
managing’ deity. 
Option 2: Value-Involving Laws 
Are there atheistic solutions to the cognitive fine-tuning problem? Thomas Nagel has recently expressed 
sympathy for the possibility that teleological laws might explain the emergence of life, consciousness, 
and rationality. The essential characteristic of teleological laws, for Nagel, is there being temporarily 
historical in their operation: 
The laws of physics are all equations specifying universal relations that hold at every time and 
place among mathematically specifiable quantities life force, mass, charge, distance, and 
velocity. In a non-teleological system the explanation of any temporally extended process has to 
consist in the explanation, by reference to those laws, of how each state of the universe evolved 
from its immediate predecessor. Teleology, by contrast, would admit irreducible principles 
governing temporally extended development.26 
Two conditions must be satisfied in order for there to be teleological laws of this kind: 
1. The non-teleological laws are non-deterministic. 
2. The teleological laws make it the case that: of the possibilities left open by the non-teleological 
laws, those possibilities which constitute progress towards the ‘ends’ of the teleological laws are 
significantly more likely than those that don’t. As Nagel puts it, ‘Teleological laws would assign 
higher probability to steps on paths in state space that have a higher ‘velocity’ towards certain 
outcomes.’27 
It is not obvious that teleological laws need be value-involving, as the ends ‘aimed at’ by the laws might 
not be of value. But the teleological laws favoured by Nagel are value-involving, in so far as the goals are 
defined in terms of are irreducibly normative, e.g. the goal of rationality. 
In order to solve the cognitive fine-tuning problem, the cognitive phenomenalist may postulate a basic 
law stipulating that conscious physical systems instantiate the most rationally appropriate cognitive 
                                                          
26 Nagel 2012: 92. 
27 Nagel 2012: 93. This terminology is from Nolan and Hawthorne’s (2006) detailed account of what it would be for 
there to be teleological laws. 
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phenomenology relative to its sensory and functional states. Unlike Nagel’s teleological laws, such a law 
would not obviously be temporally historical. It could be supposed that states of cognitive 
phenomenology arise at time T in order to match the functional and sensory states instantiated at the 
time immediately prior to T; and hence the law would not (at least not obviously) need to ‘anticipate’ 
some future possibility. However, like Nagel’s favoured teleological laws, such a law would clearly be 
value-involving, in the sense that in its most basic formulation it makes reference to an evaluative 
notion.   
Several problems remain. Firstly, one might worry that the problem has merely been deferred, not 
solved. For perhaps we now need an explanation of why, of all the laws we might have had, the actual 
laws aim at rationally appropriate cognitive phenomenology. Even supposing the intelligibility of laws 
aiming at things of value, such laws are clearly not inevitable. Indeed laws aiming at rationally 
appropriate cognitive phenomenology seem rather unlikely, given all of the other conceivable laws 
which would fail to secure rationally appropriate cognitive phenomenology. What then explains the 
fortunate fact that the actual world contain laws which ensure a rationally appropriate match, rather 
than laws which fail to? 
One option might be to embrace the axiarchism defended by John Leslie, i.e. the view that facts about 
value can themselves have a causal impact on the world.28 Thus, it could be held that: (i) there is a law of 
nature L that ensures an appropriate match between cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal 
states and functional states, and (ii) L obtains because it is good to have a rationally appropriate match 
between these three kinds of state. 
A further problem with this solution is that it threatens to render conscious thought epiphenomenal. 
The proposal is that there are laws that make it the case that the cognitive phenomenal states which 
arise in any given organism are always appropriately matched to its functional and sensory states. But if 
cognitive consciousness always arises in response to functional facts, then it doesn’t seem that it can 
play a role in determining functional facts, including the causes of behaviour. 
Option 3: Irreducible rational responsiveness/Libertarian free will 
One aspect of the cognitive fine-tuning problem is the obligation to explain why thought and 
behavioural dispositions tend to be appropriately matched. One way of explaining this might be to 
                                                          
28 Leslie 1979. 
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postulate a basic capacity to respond to reasons. Few philosophers deny that humans have a capacity to 
respond to reasons, but it is a working assumption of naturalists that that capacity is not fundamental, 
but is ultimately grounded in some more basic physical facts which do not involve responsiveness to 
reasons. However, it seems at least coherent to suppose that there are creatures which have a basic 
capacity to respond to reasons. This is presumably how we imagine angels, or God for that matter. We 
can imagine the agent Gabriel perceiving that Marie’s illness is causing her pain, recognising that this 
gives him a reason to heal her, and then responding to that reason by healing Marie. As an immaterial 
creature, Gabriel’s capacity to respond to reasons would presumably be basic rather than grounded in 
some more fundamental nature. 
In contrast to angels, human beings are, at least in part, material beings. It could nonetheless be 
supposed that the human capacity to respond in an appropriate way to reasons is metaphysically basic. 
This is likely to be conceived of as a kind of libertarian free will/and or agent causation. Substance 
dualists may suppose that this capacity is a property of the immaterial soul. Emergentists may suppose 
that it is an emergent capacity of the human organism. In either case, such a postulation could be used 
to explain the appropriate match between cognitive phenomenology and (certain) functional states: in 
virtue of this capacity human beings tend to respond appropriately to reasons which their cognitive 
phenomenology make apparent to them. For example, suppose Sarah desires to eat burgers. This gives 
her a reason her a reason to eat burgers. Now if Sarah has a basic capacity to respond to reasons, then 
perhaps through exercising that capacity she will develop the disposition to respond to that reason; and 
perhaps in this way we can explain the fact that her behavioural disposition in this case is rationally 
appropriate with respect to her desire. 
Much more detail would need to be added, and many questions answered, in order to turn this skeletal 
proposal into a fully worked out theory. How does this basic capacity interact with more standard forms 
of physical causation in the organism? Unlike Gabriel, a human’s actions are mediated via changes in the 
brain and body. How does the basic capacity to respond to reasons ‘co-ordinate’ with physical processes 
in the body and brain in order to produce human action. Why doesn’t the capacity to respond to 
reasons always work optimally, ensuring that humans are always perfectly rational? When the basic 
capacity to respond to reasons comes into conflict with instinctive drives, what decides which wins out? 
These are hard questions. However, there are detailed accounts of agent causation and libertarian free 
will, and it is possible these questions could be answered with reference to these accounts.29 If these 
                                                          
29 O’Connor 2002, Lowe 2008, Steward 2010. 
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questions can be answered satisfactorily, then there is the potential for an explanation of the fact that 
human behavioural dispositions tends to be appropriately matched to thought content.  
There are other aspects to the cognitive fine-tuning problem. We might also ask why humans have 
rationally appropriate cognitive phenomenology in the first place, and in particular why humans have 
cognitive phenomenal states which are appropriate relative to their sensory phenomenal states, rather 
than the kind of ill-fitting cognitive phenomenology exhibited, for example, by Dotty Dawkins. However, 
if we can (via the postulation of a basic capacity to respond to reasons) account for the fact that humans 
tend to respond in a rational way to the reasons made manifest to them by their conscious experience, 
then there is the potential for a Dawinian solution to the other aspects of the cognitive fine-tuning 
problem. For there is now arguably a survival advantage in an organism’s having beliefs that are 
rationally appropriate relative to the information made available by its senses: such an organism will be 
disposed to behave in an appropriate way relative to those beliefs, which will plausibly be beneficial for 
its survival. There is also the potential to explain why humans don’t tend to have desires like Inverted 
Ian: assuming they behaved in a rationally appropriate way relative to those desires, i.e. by trying to 
satisfy them, they wouldn’t survive long. 
Again much, much more would need to be said. But overall this seems to me the most promising of the 
three options we have discussed. 
Conclusion  
I have raised what I take to be a very hard problem for cognitive phenomenalism: the obligation to 
explain why in human beings cognitive phenomenal states, sensory phenomenal states, and functional 
states tend to be matched together in rationally appropriate ways. Other theories of thought avoid this 
problem, by holding that what it is for a human H to have thought T is for it to be the case that H 
behaves in such a way (and perhaps has the kind of sensory consciousness such that) the ascription of T 
to H is rationally appropriate. But principles of rationality do not come into the account of thought 
offered by the cognitive phenomenalist. As I have tried to show, this makes it very hard to see how the 
robust cognitive phenomenalist can solve the problems I have outlined. 
The only options I can think of – God, value-involving laws of nature, or basic capacities to respond to 
reasons – are wildly at odds with naturalism. It is extremely significant if these are the only options, as 
robust cognitive phenomenalists do not in general take themselves to be pursuing a project in radical 
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opposition to naturalism, and indeed some have positively argued that they are not.30 Of course it may 
be that I simply haven’t the imagination to work out a naturalistically kosha way for the robust cognitive 
phenomenalist to solve the cognitive fine-tuning problem. Still, the robust cognitive phenomenalist who 
wants to be a naturalist is obliged to succeed where I have failed. In the absence of a naturalistic 
solution to this problem, the naturalist philosopher has good reason to reject cognitive phenomenalism.  
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